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In this paper we present finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution protocol based
on weak coherent (in particular phase-coded) states using a fully quantum asymptotic equipartition
property technique. This work is the extension of the proof for non-orthogonal states on the coherent
states. Below we consider two types of attacks each of them maximizes either Alice-Eve or Eve-
Bob mutual information. The cornerstone of this paper is that we do assume the possibility of
crucial intercept-resend attack based on errorless unambiguous state discrimination measurement.
We demonstrate that Holevo bound always gives the highest mutual information between Alice and
Eve regardless particular kind of isometry. As the main result we present the dependence of the
extracted secret key length. As the example we implement the proposed analysis to the subcarrier
wave quantum key distribution protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Growing interest to quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems [1, 2] in the last decades has led to emergence of
a large number of experimental works dedicated to the
development of reliable QKD setups suitable for everyday
operation in existing telecommunication networks.
Nevertheless security proofs for different QKD systems
still require special consideration. Protocols based on
phase-coded coherent states, e.g. in [3], can still be the
good practical solution due to their utility. Despite the
unconditional security proofs for non-orthogonal states
have already been presented [4–6], they still do not cover
the case when weak coherent states are used. The differ-
ences between approaches are crucial and, from our point
view, the paper directs to more practical cases. Hence
the protocols based on coherent states are now might be
secure by introducing the first analysis of the finite-key
security against general attacks.
We use common approach based on assumption that
all rounds of protocols are independent and identically-
distributed (i.i.d.) [7–10]. This assumption naturally
takes place since each of the N signals is prepared, sent,
and received independently of the other signals (this is
equivalent that the protocol is invariant under permu-
tations of the states held by Bob after the distribution
phase[11]).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives
the detailed description of the representation of the state
space and the strategy of possible attacks with maximiza-
tion over mutual information between Alice and Eve (in-
dependent from error and detection rates) on weak coher-
ent (non-orthogonal) states protocols in approximation of
infinite number of rounds (in terms of complitely-positive
trace-preserving (CPTP) maps), as well as potential vul-
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nerability (consequent from the utilization of weak co-
herent state) and its practical solution. Section III gives
the detailed description of the finite-key analysis for con-
sidered type of protocols. In Section IV we assert the
main results of our paper. In Appendix A we provide
the example of the proof implemented to real subcarrier
wave (SCW) QKD system.
II. EXTENSION OF THE SECURITY FOR
B92-LIKE PROTOCOLS
In this section we would like to explain which ex-
tensions compared to existing security proofs [4–6] we
present in this paper. Despite the techniques presented
in those papers are strong, they are rather impractical
due to some assumptions. One of them is requirement of
the true single-photon sources while the majority of QKD
systems nowadays are based on coherent states (or mixed
states) and those security proofs can not be implemented
directly to them. Moreover in the papers authors assume
that the measurement on the Bob’s (and/or Eve’s) side
is realized in Breidbart basis [12]. This means that the
distinguishing measurement of non-orthogonal states is
performed with only (optimized) error and without in-
conclusive result. Nevertheless the construction of mea-
surement device incarnating this measurement in real live
is impossible due to imperfections of the quantum optical
devices; they always provide inconclusive results.
Worth noticing that since we are getting rid of these
assumptions the errorless unambiguous state discrimina-
tion attack can be provided by Eve. Thus the extension of
the security proof on the case of real systems implement-
ing weak coherent (non-orthogonal) states looks natural.
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2A. Description of the state space
First of all let us introduce the space of the states
prepared by Alice. In general case the space of the
states spaned over the vectors |αi〉. Index i denotes
different states with arbitrary way of information cod-
ing, i.e. phase-coded states. They can be described
in terms of representation basis of abelian cyclic point
symmetry groups CM respectively (equally distributed
in phase plane and with equal a priori sending probabil-
ities). Representation of this group in basis |αj〉, where
j = 1...M are denoted by operators Gph, which applied
to basis elements as follows
Gph|αj〉 = exp
(
i2pi
M
a†a
)
|αj〉 =
∣∣∣αj exp( i2pi
M
)〉
, (1)
where a is the photon annihilation operator andM is the
number of implemented states.
The Hilbert space of the prepared sequences of the
states H⊗N space, where N is the number of prepaired
states and H is the Hilbert space of each M-dimensional
signal. The Hilbert space of the prepared sequences has
a natural orthogonal decomposition according to the ir-
reducible representations of the permutation group of N
points, acting as the permutations of the tensor factors.
On the space H⊗N the representation of the symmetric
group of permutations of the order of signals and the ten-
sor representation of the abelian group CM can be real-
ized. The dimension of this representation isMN . These
two representations are “commutants” of each other ac-
cording to [13]. Thus the representation of the states
allows to symmetrize the space of sequences.
Since we assume that the considered states are i.i.d.,
the analysis of coherent attacks can be reduced to the
analysis against collective attacks (however the proof of
the fact that considered states are i.i.d. is out of scope
in this paper).
Considering collective attack Eve can measure the in-
tercepted states after reconciliation. Such opportunity
leads to some crucial advantage. Due to the symmetric
structure of the states and their invariance to the unitary
rotation, described as an evolution operator, Eve can sim-
ply shifts the phase or polarisation of the states by using
an appropriate unitary rotation of state. The unitary ro-
tation does not change the accessible information, thus
this is equivalent that Eve distinguishes between only two
states as in the B92-like protocol case and it does not de-
pend from the number of used states (for the purposes of
estimation mutual information between Alice and Eve).
B. Capacity estimation for quantum channel
Let us consider the quantum channel as CPTP lin-
ear map. There are three different notations known
as Stinespring theorem [14], Kraus operator, and Choi-
Jamiołkowski representation [15, 16]. We will consider
Stinespring notation (in terms of unitary isometries, see
Fig. 1) to estimate amount of information leaked to Eve
considering complementary channel following [16]. After
we define bound on Eve’s information independent on
type of isometry.
Let A,B, E be Hilbert spaces of Alice, Bob and Eve
respectively. Stinespring theorem states that for ev-
ery quantum channel Q there always exists an isometry
U : A ↪→ B ⊗ E , such that U†U = I, that maps from A
to the joint system B ⊗ E . Taking partial trace on the
system E such that Q(ρ) = TrEUρU† for all ρ belongs
to space of trace class operators acting on Hilbert spaces
A. Tracing out system B instead of E defines a com-
plementary channel Qc(ρ) = TrBUρU†. Capacity (more
precisely Holevo capacity) of the complementary channel
characterizes mutual information; considering it one may
derive conditional von Neumann entropy between Alice
and Eve (as it will be used further in Eq. 14). In gen-
eral case the capacity of quantum complementary chan-
nel in terms of QKD can be described as classical capacity
C (Qc) [17, 18] and can be denoted as the rate of reliably
sent classical information through any quantum channel.
It can be expressed using the Holevo capacity χ(Qc) for
given state (and given type of isometry) and has the next
form assuming i.i.d. case
C (Qc) = lim
N→∞
1
N
χ((Qc)⊗n) = χ(Qc), (2)
where N is the number of sent qubits and
χ(Qc) = S
(∑
x
pxQc(ρx)
)
−
∑
x
pxS(Qc(ρx)), (3)
where S(ρ) = −Tr{ρ log ρ} is the von Neumann entropy
and ρ is the unconditioned channel density operator.
Let us consider the result of isometry in order to es-
timate Holevo capacity in complimentary channel. We
denote states prepared by Alice as
|u〉 = G0ph|α0〉 = I2|α0〉 = |α0〉, (4)
|v〉 = Gph|α0〉 = Gph|u〉 = | − α0〉, (5)
where |α0〉 is the initial state. Eve performs unitary oper-
ation (described by isometry) between states in the chan-
nel and Eve’s ancillas to make them (in general case)
entangled in some way [19]
{
|u〉 −→ a|u˜〉 ⊗ |ψu˜E 〉+ b|v˜〉 ⊗ |ψv˜E〉
|v〉 −→ b|u˜〉 ⊗ |ψu˜E 〉+ a|v˜〉 ⊗ |ψv˜E〉,
(6)
where a and b are arbitrary coefficients satisfying norm
and unitarity conditions, {|u〉, |v〉} is the space of pre-
pared by Alice states, {|u˜〉, |v˜〉} is the space of states in
quantum channel after Eve’s actions, {|ψu˜E 〉, |ψv˜E〉} is the
space of Eve’s ancillas in complimentary channel (one
may assume without loss of generality that Eve had the
initial state |ψE〉 of her ancilla considering unitary evolu-
tion of purificated state).
3It can be shown that Holevo capacity of complemen-
tary channel is maximized when a = 1 and b = 0 (or vise
versa) impying untangled (but interacted) states
{
|u〉 −→ |u˜〉 ⊗ |ψu˜E 〉
|v〉 −→ |v˜〉 ⊗ |ψv˜E〉.
(7)
It is known that isometry preserve the overlappings of
the states
〈u|v〉 = 〈u˜|v˜〉 · 〈ψu˜E |ψv˜E〉. (8)
In order to gain any information Eve should (unambigu-
ously or with error) distinguish between |ψu˜E 〉 and |ψv˜E〉
hence these states should be separated, i.e. 〈ψu˜E |ψv˜E〉 < 1,
thus 〈u˜|v˜〉 ≤ 1. Thus one may deduce the following state-
ment implying Eve has any information
〈u|v〉 ≤ 〈ψu˜E |ψv˜E〉. (9)
Holevo capacity is decreasing function of overlapping.
Hence one may substitute left-hand side for right-hand
side overlapping in Eq. 9 as new argument of Holevo
capacity. This gives us higher information bound (the
Holevo bound) and also eleminates the neccessity to con-
sider particular kinds of isometries
χ(ρ) ≥ χ(Qc(ρ)). (10)
Holevo bound depends on mean photon number (as
well as overlapping of the states), hence it can reach the
unity for higher intensities. Due to this one should take
into consideration only the practical cases when mean
photon number is low enough.
C. Potential vulnerability
However consideration of only the Holevo bound
(which is independent from error and detection rate) due
to implementation of the weak coherent states is insuf-
ficient and leads to crucial loophole covered further. As
far as weak coherent states are also overlapped, they can-
not be distinguished perfectly, although Eve can discrim-
inate them unambiguously only with the some probabil-
ity (depending on the used states and hence the values of
their overlapping). In comparison to the security proof
for single-photon QKD schemes the unambiguous state
discrimination (USD) attack with inconclusive result yet
zero error can be implemented.
In this work we consider only errorless USD attack
since it is much more crucial then discrimination with op-
timized error (Helstrom bound [20]). The construction of
the USD positive-operator valued measure (POVM) pro-
vides for Eve only two possible outcomes for each state:
the unambiguous identification of the particular state and
the inconclusive result. All inconclusive results can be
blocked (exchanged with vacuum states) by Eve and she
can increase the intensity of sent pulses to maintain the
detection rates. It is possible due to the big number of
inconclusive results on the Bob’s side due to losses in the
channel and low quantum efficiency of detectors.
The strategy allows Eve to provide zero-error attack
keeping up to 100% of shared bits between Alice and
Bob and maintaining both raw key rates and error rates.
Surprisingly the attack is more crucial than some collec-
tive attacks (for instance collective beam-splitting attack
in [3]). It can be explained by the fact that the informa-
tion obtained by collective attacks on the systems with
weak coherent states is mutual information between Al-
ice and Eve I(A;E) and it can be bounded with Holevo
bound. Otherwise when we analyse the USD attack we
have to estimate mutual information between Eve and
Bob I(E;B). In case of the attack the latter mutual
information is higher than Holevo bound and equals to
unity since all quantum bits detected by Bob are send
by Eve. Due to the fact there is no possibility to extract
any secret key.
D. Practical solution
Nevertheless there is solution providing practical coun-
termeasures against the attack. In paper [21] it was
shown that if we satisfy the next condition Eve will be
revealed
1−G > PUSD, (11)
where 1 − G is expected detection probability (by G we
assume the probability of "null" count, i.e. see Eq. A15
in the Appendix as an example) and PUSD is probabil-
ity of unambiguous state discrimination. Obviously there
are two main strategies. The first is to increase 1 − G,
the second is to decrease PUSD. The second strategy
looks more convenient from the practical point of view
(inequality 11 should be satisfied for all acceptable chan-
nel losses where we can extract secret key). To do so
one can simply increase the number of states (bases). If
following inequality satisfies that there might be USD
attack with the probability erf( z√
2
), where the latter is
error function,
n < N · (1−G)− zσ, (12)
σ =
√
N ·G(1−G), (13)
where n is the number of detected quantum bits, N is the
number of sent signals (its value should be chosen appro-
priately [21]) and z is the arbitrary number of standard
deviations σ within the confidence interval according to
the so-called "three–sigma rule". If the inequality sat-
isfies we abort the protocol. However there is arbitrary
small probability 1−erf( z√
2
) that USD attack would not
be detected.
4Figure 1. Visual interpretation of considered isometry where
initial states |u〉 and |v〉 are mapped by (meaning transmis-
sion in) quantum channel Q(ρ) and complimentary quantum
channel Qc(ρ) to states |u˜〉 and |v˜〉 available to Bob and states
of Eve’s ancillas |ψu˜E〉 and |ψv˜E〉 respectively. Grey area means
possible entanglement of the states or at least their previous
interaction. Here |ψu˜E〉 and |ψv˜E〉 entangled with |u˜〉 and |v˜〉
respectively.
III. SECURITY NOTATION
After the quantum states are sent and measured, Al-
ice and Bob each have n-bit strings A and B. Corre-
spondingly Eve has side information E. To estimate ap-
propriate bound on secure key rate we consider the no-
tation of Renyi entropies Hα(X) = 11−α log (
∑n
i=1 p
α
i ),
since they describe the worst case and not the average
one. In the paper we consider that α → ∞ since we use
min-entropy H∞(X) = Hmin = − log maxi pi. Futher
we will use quantum asymptotic equipartition property
(QAEP) [7]. It means that for a large number of rounds,
the operationally relevant total uncertainty can be well
approximated (and bounded) by the sum over all inde-
pendent and identically-distributed (i.i.d.) rounds. Thus
we bound ε-smooth min-entropy [22, 23] as follows
HεSmin(A|E) ≥ n
(
H(A|E)− δ(εS)√
n
)
, (14)
where
δ(εS) = 4 log(2 +
√
2)
√
log
(
2
ε2S
)
(15)
and H(A|E) is conditional von Neumann entropy and it
denotes the entropy of Alice’s bit conditioned on Eve’s
side-information in a single round (and it is constant due
to i.i.d. assumption), in terms of coherent-state-based
protocols it can be bounded asH(A|E) ≥ 1−χ(ρ), where
ρ is unconditioned channel density operator, which can
be expressed as follows
ρ =
∑
i
piρi (16)
where ρi is the density matrix of each state, and pi is the
a priori sending probability of this state.
A. Parameter estimation
Nevertheless we can apply proposed analysis to the
protocol only after parameter estimation, since we still
have to reveal any intercept-resend attacks. Exchanging
the conditional von Neumann entropy with Holevo bound
which is constant and independent on error or detection
rate is a crucial point there. Performing intercept-resend
attack with error on small fraction of qubits does not
give Eve more information than Holevo bound otherwise
it will produce too high QBER leading to negative secure
key rates. In other words there is no common parameter
estimation on QBER. Its not the only parameter that
we should worry about due to introduced errorless at-
tack. Hence in case of errorless intercept-resend attack
described above one should monitor the detection rates
according to the inequality 12. If the inequality is satis-
fied one should abort the protocol, on the contrary the
following security analysis can be applied.
B. Error correction
On this step both parties should check and correct the
errors in their bit strings. It can be done using any er-
ror correction code. In the paper we assume that Alice
and Bob uses low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes at
the error correction step. Bob publicly sends a random
subset of k bits to Alice, and she estimates quantum bit
error rate (QBER) Qest in that subset. It should be
noted that LDPC codes succeed if value of real QBER
Qreal (see Appendix A 3 for more details) less than ref-
erence value parametrized the code. Thus Alice needs
additional QBER ∆Q. For instance it can be estimated
in order to maximize probability of successful error cor-
rection in one round and keeping maximal secret key rate.
It can be found considering bounds for sampling without
replacement [24] as follows
Pr(Qest + ∆Q < Qreal) ≤ exp
( −2k∆Q2
1− (k − 1)/n
)
, (17)
where k is the number of bits in the sample. Then Alice
computes the syndrome of LDPC code that corrects up
to n(Qest + ∆Q) error bits. We denote the length of the
syndrome as codeEC which is some function of n(Qest +
∆Q). For (only) analytical and/or estimation purposes
we may express codeEC as asymptotic approximation
codeEC ≈ nfECh(Qest + ∆Q), (18)
where fEC is error correction efficiency. Using the syn-
drome, Bob corrects his bits to some new bitstring B′.
Then Bob applies a 2-universal hash function with output
length checkEC to B′ and sends hash to Alice checking
5whether their strings match. If hashes are different Alice
enlarges ∆Q or abort the protocol. Otherwise Alice ob-
tained the bitstring A′. The remaining smooth-entropy
is conservatively lower-bound by simply subtracting off
the total number of bits publicly revealed
HεSmin(A
′|E) ≥ n
(
H(A|E)− δ(εS)√
n
)
−
−k − codeEC − checkEC ,
(19)
We would like to stress out that the value codeEC put
into this bound must be the number of bits actually sent
in particular round, approximation in Eq. 18 may be used
only for analytical and/or estimation purposes.
C. Privacy amplification and key extraction
At this point Alice and Bob performs privacy ampli-
fication. They hash their bitstrings to a key of length l
(see [25]), where
l = n
(
H(A|E)− δ(εS)√
n
)
− k−
−codeEC − checkEC − lossPA,
(20)
where lossPA is a parameter chosen in order to achieve a
curtain level of security (see further in following subsec-
tion).
We use the definitions given in Section 2.5 of [26] and
roughly follow the analysis in Section 5.1.
When considering the error correction step, we have
to estimate “correctness error” εEC. Alice and Bob com-
pare hashes of length checkEC ensures that the probabil-
ity that A′ 6= B′ and Alice and Bob fail to abort (i.e.
their hashes match) is
εEC = 2
−checkEC . (21)
This follows from the properties of 2-universal hashing.
For the privacy amplification, the output of the extrac-
tor has length l ≤ Hεsmin(A′|E)− lossPA. Therefore, using
the bound in [25] then tells us that the trace distance d
between the protocol’s output and an ideal output (where
the key is uniform and independent from Eve, even after
Eve knows the matrix used for the hashing) is bounded
above by
d =
1
2
‖ρKFE − ωK ⊗ σFE‖1
≤ εs + 1
2
√
2l−H
εs
min(A
′|E)
≤ εs + 1
2
√
2−lossPA
≤ εs + εPA = εsec,
(22)
where in the last step we introduce the quantity εsec as
an upper bound on the trace distance d.
Overall, in terms of the definitions given in Section
2.5 of [26], this means that the protocol is εcorr-correct
with εcorr = εEC (see Definition 1) and εsec-secure with
εsec = εs + εPA (see Definition 2). Phrasing it in terms
of Definition 3, the protocol is hence εQKD-secure-and-
correct, with εQKD = εEC + εs+ εPA providing secure bit
string with length
l = n(1− χ(ρ))− 4√n log(2 +
√
2)
√
log
(
2
ε2S
)
−
−k − codeEC − log 1
εEC
− log 1
εPA
+ 2.
(23)
IV. RESULTS
In this paper we consider security of coherent-state-
based QKD protocols. We discuss the differences be-
tween existing proofs and the one in present paper and
the consequences of this extension. The cornerstone of
this work is that we do assume the possibility of crucial
intercept-resend attack based on errorless USD measure-
ment. It is justified by the fact that weak coherent states
are used and the measurement at the Bob’s side always
produces inconclusive result.
Introduction of Holevo bound and alternation of pa-
rameter estimation cover security loopholes. The in-
equality for detection rate estimation introduced in Sec-
tion IID. We demonstrate in details why we use Holevo
bound as the highest amount of mutual information be-
tween Alice an Eve regardless particular kind of attack
described in terms of isometry. Finite-key security anal-
ysis is performed by implementation of fully quantum
asymptotic equipartition property. As the main result we
estimate extracted secret key length (Eq. 23). In the ap-
pendix we present the implementation of proposed proof
for subcarrier wave (SCW) QKD system. The average
secure key rate R dependence on channel losses in SCW
QKD system for different number of detected quantum
bits is presented in Appendix A4.
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Appendix A: Security analysis for SCW QKD
protocol
In the appendix we would like introduce the example of
such security proof for SCW QKD protocol. One of the
most valuable feature of SCW QKD systems [3, 27–33]
6is exceptionally efficient use of quantum channel band-
width and capability of signal multiplexing by adding in-
dependent sets of quantum subcarriers around the same
carrier wave [29]. It makes SCW QKD systems perfect
candidates as a backbone of multiuser quantum networks.
The following section give the detailed description of the
quantum states, Holevo bound for used states, detection
scheme and performance estimation.
1. Quantum state preparation
Several kind of protocols can be implemented in our
system, i.e. with two (ϕA ∈ {0, pi}), four (ϕA ∈
{0, pi, pi/2, 3pi/2}) and, in general, any even number of
signal weak coherent phase-coded states which can be de-
scribed in terms of representation basis of abelian cyclic
point symmetry groups CM respectively (equally dis-
tributed in phase plane and with equal a priori send-
ing probabilities). We propose here the protocol based
on sixteen states (eight bases). The initial state (be-
fore modulation) can be described as |√µ0〉0 ⊗ |vac〉SB ,
where |vac〉SB is the vacuum state of the sidebands and
|√µ0〉0 is the coherent state of the carrier wave with the
amplitude determined by the average number of pho-
tons µ0 in a transmission window provided with coherent
monochromatic light beam with optical frequency ω. The
carrier wave phase is accepted as reference and all other
phases are calculated with respect to it. Electro-optical
phase modulator (with the frequency of the microwave
field Ω and its phase ϕA) rearranges the energy between
the interacting modes (the field at the modulator output
acquires sidebands at frequencies ωk = ω + kΩ, we limit
our consideration to 2S sidebands and let the integer k
run between the limits −S ≤ k ≤ S), so that the state of
the field at the modulator output (in quantum channel)
is a multimode coherent state
|ψ(ϕA)〉 =
S⊗
k=−S
|αk(ϕA)〉k, (A1)
where amplitudes of coherent states presented as
αk(ϕA) =
√
µ0d
S
0k(β)e
−i(θ1+ϕA)k, (A2)
where θ1 is a constant phase and dSnk(β) is the Wigner
d-function from the quantum theory of angular momen-
tum [34], β is determined by the modulation index m,
disregarding the modulator medium dispersion the de-
pendence can be written as
cos (β) = 1− 1
2
(
m
S + 0.5
)2
. (A3)
where 2S + 1 is number of interacting modes and it is
considerably large. The more detailed description of the
states and their properties can be found in [3, 35].
Under certain conditions, the model of such modula-
tion process is exactly solvable and can be analysed using
the technique of the Jordan mappings for the SU(2) Lie
algebra [35].
2. Holevo bound
In case of subcarrier wave quantum key distribution
Holevo bound can be found considering unconditioned
channel density operator (this is possible due to the fact
that Eve can rotate all states stored in her quantummem-
ory after reconciliation and before her measurment)
ρ =
1
2
|u〉〈u|+ 1
2
|v〉〈v| =
=
1
2
|ψ(0)〉〈ψ(0)|+ 1
2
|ψ(pi)〉〈ψ(pi)|,
(A4)
where |ψ(0)〉 and |ψ(pi)〉 are denoted according to A1.
The von Neumann entropy of a density operator is the
Shannon entropy of its eigenvalues. The eigenvalues of
the operator ρ are
λ1,2 =
1
2
(1± |〈ψ(0)|ψ(pi)〉|) , (A5)
The overlapping of our states can be described as (for
more details see [3])
〈ψ(0)|ψ(pi)〉 = exp [−µ0 (1− dS00(2β))] . (A6)
Therefore we obtain the Holevo bound using binary Shan-
non entropy function h(x) = −x log x− (1−x) log(1−x)
of the eigenvalues defined by Eq. (A5):
χ(ρ) = h
(
1
2
(1− exp [−µ0 (1− dS00(2β))]) . (A7)
3. Detection scheme
The main idea of detection scheme is to provide con-
structive or destructive interference of the whole spec-
trum of sidebands, thereby distinguishing received states.
On the Bob’s side there is the phase modulator which has
the same frequency Ω as in the Alice’s one, but a different
phase ϕ. In this modulator, additional field is generated
on the same sidebands ω+ kΩ, which interferes with the
field already present on these frequencies. The resulting
state of the field is also the multimode coherent state
|ψB(ϕA, ϕ)〉 =
S⊗
k=−S
|α′k(ϕA, ϕ)〉k, (A8)
with coherent amplitudes
α′k(ϕA, ϕ) =
√
µ0η(L) exp(−iθ2k)dS0k(β′), (A9)
where η(L) = 10−ξL/10 is transmission coefficient of the
quantum channel, ξ is the fiber loss per length unit, and
the new argument of the d-function is determined by the
relation
cosβ′ = cos2 β − sin2 β cos (ϕA − ϕ+ ϕ0) , (A10)
7Figure 2. Secure key rate R dependence on channel losses in
SCW QKD system with different number of detected quan-
tum bits. It should be noted that for n = 105 one cannot
generate secure key, and for n slightly more than 105 secure
key rate drops drastically compared to close to asymptotic
cases.
where θ2 and ϕ0 are some phases determined by the con-
struction of the phase modulator [35].
Equation (A10) shows that in order to achieve con-
structive interference on the sidebands, Bob should use
ϕ0 as an offset for his phase and apply in his modulator
the microwave phase ϕ = ϕ0+ϕB . Then for ϕA−ϕB = 0
the argument of d-function doubles: β′ = 2β while for
ϕA − ϕB = ±pi it vanishes: β′ = 0. Since dS0k(0) = δ0k,
a zero argument corresponds to the presence of photons
only on the carrier frequency, with all the sidebands be-
ing in the vacuum state.
We are interested only in sidebands of our spectrum
due to all information about the phase is presented in
the sidebands and the carrier wave phase is accepted as
reference. To do so we apply spectral filtering in Bob’s
module, which aims at removing the relatively strong car-
rier wave. Unfortunately, in a practical SCW QKD sys-
tem this wave can only be attenuated by a factor ϑ 1,
resulting in replacement α¯0(ϕA, ϕB)→
√
ϑα¯0(ϕA, ϕB).
Thus, the average number of photons arriving at Bob’s
detector in the gate window T in time domain is given
by the average total number of photons at all spectral
components
nph(ϕA, ϕB) = ϑ|α¯0(ϕA, ϕB)|2 +
∑
k 6=0
|α¯k(ϕA, ϕB)|2
= µ0η(L)ηB
(
1− (1− ϑ)|dS00(β′)|2
)
,(A11)
where ηB is the losses in Bob’s module and according to
the property of d-functions [34]
S∑
k=−S
dSnk(β)
(
dSlk(β)
)∗
= δnl, (A12)
meaning that dSnk(β) is a unitary matrix with respect to
its lower indices
Thus probability of a click on the detector operating
in Geiger regime in the window T is as follows according
to Mandel approximation (considering nph  1)
Pdet(ϕA, ϕB) =
(
ηD
nph(ϕA, ϕB)
T
+ γdark
)
∆t (A13)
where ηD is the detector quantum efficiency, γdark is the
dark count rates, ∆t = T for continuous operation of the
detector, and ∆t < T is gating time of the detector if
there any. Using Eq. A13 one may estimate detection
probabilities (1−G), error probabilities (E), and QBER
(Q) using following notation
E = Pdet(0, pi + ∆ϕ), (A14)
1−G = Pdet(0,∆ϕ) + Pdet(0, pi + ∆ϕ), (A15)
Q =
E
1−G, (A16)
where ∆ϕ is slight phase instability caused, for instance,
by jitter or imperfect synchronization.
4. Performance estimation
Let us introduce performance estimations as an exam-
ple. We use µ0 = 4 and m = 0.319 in order to provide
optimal mean photon number at sidebands which was
found to be µ = 0.2 in [3]. Duration of the pulses T
is 10 ns (it is equivalent to 100 MHz repetition rates).
The fraction of the carrier transmitted through the fil-
ter ϑ is 10−3, phase instability ∆ϕ is 5◦, total losses at
the Bob’s side ηB is 6.4 dB. We refer to the parame-
ters of the detector ID230 from ID Quantique: quantum
efficiency ηD is 25% and dark counts are at 25 Hz rate.
Probability of failing error correction in one round is cho-
sen to be equal to 10−6 hence the precise value of sam-
ple size k is estimated maximizing secret key rate, i.e.
minimizing expression h(Q + ∆Q(k)) + k by k (for in-
stance, k is approximately 4% of total received pulses for
n = 106 and approximately 2% of total received pulses
for n = 107). Also security parameter εQKD = 3 · 10−10
with εEC = εs = εPA = 10
−10.
Finally dividing Eq. 23 by n to estimate secret key frac-
tion and multiplying it by repetition rate and detection
probability in Eq. A13 we obtain dependencies of aver-
age secret key rates on losses in the channel for different
values of n as follows
R =
F (1−G)
M
·
(
1− χ(ρ)−
− 4 1√
n
log(2 +
√
2)
√
log
(
2
ε2S
)
− (A17)
− 1
n
(
k + codeEC + log
1
εEC
+ log
1
εPA
− 2)),
8where F is the signal sending frequency. Those depen-
dencies for different n are shown in Fig. 2. Obtained re-
sults are important for constructing secure long-distance
QKD links and multiuser quantum networks by exploit-
ing advantages of the SCW QKD: ultra-high QKD band-
width capacity and compatibility with existing optical
communication infrastructure.
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